Natural resources: a curse or a blessing? Political incentives in the resource allocation (example of gazprom)
Electronic Archive of Sumy State University
Переглянути архів Інформація| Поле | Співвідношення | |
| Title |
Natural resources: a curse or a blessing? Political incentives in the resource allocation (example of gazprom)
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| Creator |
Teslyuk, Nataliya
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| Description |
In my presentation I will reflect on whether politicians (in particular Russian ones) tend to over-extract the natural resources, because of the boundaries to their short-term power and the willingness to satisfy the needs of the population during the period when they are in control; this strategy can contradict effective path in the medium, and long run. There is a model developed to answer to this questions by the scientists of Norwegian University of Science and Technology, James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier which can be applied to Russia as well, but interestingly there are major differences, and it seems to be that Russia’s situation is distinct, what does not surprise much taking into account its position on the market.
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| Publisher |
Видавництво СумДУ
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| Date |
2011-06-22T10:07:54Z
2011-06-22T10:07:54Z 2007 |
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| Type |
Article
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| Identifier |
Teslyuk, Nataliya. Natural resources: a curse or a blessing? Political incentives in the resource allocation (example of gazprom) [Текст] / Nataliya Teslyuk // Economics for Ecology ISCS'2007 : 13th International Student Conference, Sumy, May 3-7, 2007. - Суми: СумДУ, 2007. - С.169-170.
http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/13105 |
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| Language |
en
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