Запис Детальніше


Поле	Співвідношення

Title	Pure strategies pareto efficient situations versus pure strategies nash equilibrium situations by their stochastically constrained payoffs in dyadic game modeling of resources rational usage with alternative choice of action

Names	Romanuke, V.V. Романюк, В.В.
Date Issued	2014 (iso8601)
Abstract	There is considered contrariety of Pareto efficient situations and Nash equilibrium situations in dyadic games. Their players’ payoffs are constrained by normal and uniform laws. Solving these games in pure strategies, there is the advantageousness of maximal mean payoffs in Pareto efficient situations. In resources rational usage, this fact can be applied for projecting collective work at more efficient rate.
Genre	Стаття
Topic	resources rational usage
Identifier	Romanuke, V. V. Pure strategies pareto efficient situations versus pure strategies nash equilibrium situations by their stochastically constrained payoffs in dyadic game modeling of resources rational usage with alternative choice of action [Текст] / V. V. Romanuke // Вісник Хмельницького національного університету. Технічні науки. – 2014. – № 6. – С. 140-143.